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Edward P.  Lazear and Robert L. Moore 
Over the past few years, a number of authors have attempted to ex- 
amine the effects of pensions on retirement and worker turnover in 
general. Lazear (1982, 1983a, 1983b), Wolf and Levy (1984), Kotlikoff 
and Wise (1987), Mitchell and Fields (1984), and Frant and Leonard 
(1987), among others, have investigated the pattern of pension accruals 
and the effects of various pension provisions on worker behavior. While 
that literature has made  definite progress  toward understanding  the 
relation of pensions to turnover, it has suffered from two basic problems. 
First, for the most part (Mitchell and Fields [I9841 is an exception), 
the empirical analyses have been unable to match  workers  with the 
exact plans in which they are enrolled. For example, in Lazear (1982, 
1983b), all that was available was information on the plans, with no 
information on worker behavior. Even aggregate statistics on average 
age of retirement and the age distribution of the work force were absent. 
As such, it was impossible to assess the impact of the various plans 
on worker turnover. 
Second, the specifications used in the literature are not quite correct 
and lead to inappropriate inferences. What most researchers do when 
attempting to look at the effect of pensions on turnover is to examine 
the value of the pension conditional on retirement at some chosen date. 
Thus, the pension value (or accrual amount) associated with the eigh- 
teenth  year of  work  is based  on some assumed  date of  retirement. 
Often that date is the year itself. Lazear (1982, 1983b) presented the 
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expected present value of the pension for every age of retirement be- 
tween 55 and 75. Although that information is useful and forms the 
starting point for this analysis, it is not the correct independent variable 
to use when trying to estimate the effect of  pensions on worker turn- 
over. As it turns out, the pension value, calculated in that fashion, is 
generally more discontinuous than the value that affects behavior. It 
is no surprise that trying to relate the raw pension  values to worker 
turnover is not especially fruitful. The following example illustrates the 
point. 
Consider a stylized military plan that vests after 20  years and pro- 
vides a zero credit for any years worked after year 20. This results in 
a very discontinuous pension  pattern.  The pension value associated 
with retirement before 20 years of  service is zero and is positive at 20 
years.  Beyond that, the pension value falls because fewer years are 
paid out and no credit adjustment is made. If P(t)  is the pension value 
associated with retirement after t years of  tenure, then P(t) = 0 for t 
less than 20. Since P(t)  does not vary until year 20, it cannot affect 
turnover differentially during that  period.  But in reality,  one would 
expect that the effect of this pension formula on turnover would be 
greater in year  19  than in year 2. Workers who have only been with 
the firm for 2 years still have 18 years to wait for the pension to vest. 
The option value of staying an additional year varies with tenure even 
though P(t)  does not. 
The most obvious way to see this is to imagine that data were avail- 
able only on workers whose tenure was less than 19 years. If P(t)  were 
the dependent variable, then it would be zero for all of these workers. 
Yet, as workers get closer to year 20, it must be true that the force of 
the pension on turnover rates increases. The approach that we develop 
picks this effect up in a smooth and more theoretically appropriate 
fashion. The effect of  pensions on turnover could be estimated even if 
no workers had ever gone past the date of vesting (say, because the 
plan is new and workers are young). More important, the approach is 
dynamic; it takes into account that workers look toward the future. 
The current year’s pension accrual is relevant, but not sufficient. The 
pension available 3 years hence may exert a stronger influence on this 
year’s work decision than the current pension accrual. 
This paper does two things: First, it derives the appropriate pension 
variable to use in a regression that relates turnover to pensions. Second, 
it constructs a new data set and applies the approach to those data. 
The data include explicit information on the pension formula and also 
on the workers who are currently employed. Their starting dates, birth- 
dates, sex, marital status (in some cases), and  salary history for  11 
years are provided. Although no information on workers who have left 
the firm is available, under certain assumptions it is sufficient to ex- 165  Pensions and Turnover 
amine the tenure distribution of current employees. Additionally, we 
have information on six different plans and their workers so that there 
is enough variation  to obtain estimates of the effects of pensions on 
turnover. 
The primary  empirical  conclusion is  that  pensions  have  a  strong 
effect  on turnover.  In  these data, eliminating the  average  worker’s 
pension  would double the turnover rate. We  hasten to add that this 
conclusion is  tentative.  The current  state  of  our data allows  US  to 
obtain estimates only under quite strong assumptions. Still, as a first 
guess, the results show the potential importance of the effect of pen- 
sions on turnover. 
6.1  Theory: The Option Value of Working 
To focus on the relevant variable, we ignore any wage payments and 
suppose (obviously unrealistically) that total compensation consists of 
pensions.  Define P(t)  as the expected value in year  t dollars of the 
pension flow that is available to the worker if  he severs his ties to the 
firm at the conclusion of year t. Further, define V(t) as the value as- 
sociated with working during year t in year t dollars. This option value 
can be defined recursively: 
In year T, the final year, the option value of work is 
V(T) = P(T) - [P(T - l)](l  + r), 
where r is the rate of interest. This is the difference between what the 
worker receives in pension value if he works until time T as compared 
with time T - 1. The value of working year T - 1 is, correspondingly, 
V(T - 1)  = max[P(T - I), P(T)/(l + r)] - [P(T -  2)1(1  + r). 
The first term says work in year T - 1 gives the worker the option of 
taking the pension available after year T - 1 or of going on to work 
year T and getting P(T), discounted back to year T - 1 dollars. If the 
worker does not work year T - 1, he can have the pension P(T -  2), 
which must be multiplied by 1 + r to put it in year T -  1 dollars. Note 
that this information assumes (relaxed below) that the worker can, with 
certainty, opt to work year T and receive that pension. In year T -  2, 
a similar formula gives 
V(T -  2) = max[P(T - 2), P(T - 1)/(1  + Y), 
or using the first term of  V(T - l), this can be rewritten as 
V(T - 2)  = max {P(T - 2), max [P(T - l), 
P(T)/(1 + Y)’]  -  P(T - 3)(1  + Y), 
P(T)]II + r} - P(T - 3)(1  + Y). 166  Edward P.  LazeadRobert L. Moore 
Define M(t) = max[P(r), M(t  +  1)/(1 + r)],  and M(T) = P(T),  so 
that we can write generally 
(1)  V(t)  = M(t) - [P(t - 1)](1  + r). 
Equation (1) and the definition of M(t)  make more obvious the intuition 
of the earlier example and previous paragraph. Consider a very similar 
example where P(10) > 0, but P(t) = 0 for t < 10. If P(11) < P(lO), 
max [P(lO), M(ll)/(l + r)] = P(l0). But max[P(9), M(10)/(1 + r)] = 
M(lO)/(l + Y)  = P(10)/(1 + r),  not P(9),  which equals zero. Similarly, 
M(8) = P(10)/(1  +  u)~,  and  so forth. Thus, the  V(t)  series is much 
smoother between t  = 9, 10 than the P(t)  series. 
The importance of  this formulation can be seen even more clearly 
if  the pension formula is such that pensions continue to accrue after 
year 10. In the previous example, there is a spike in V(t), but it comes 
between  10 and 11, not between 9 and 10. This is because the value 
of staying to year 11 is negative. If accruals occur after year 10 so that 
the maximum value is achieved by retiring, say, at year 30, the spike 
at 11 goes away for the most part as well. There is a discontinuity only 
to the extent that P(9), which is subtracted to get V(lO), is zero, where 
P(lO),  subtracted to get V(l l), is not. But the difference between 0 and 
P(  10) is small compared with M(  10) or M(  11) in  most practical situa- 
tions. As will be seen below, the only time that these magnitudes are 
not small is when the worker is old at the year 10 vesting point. Then 
the option value spikes are important. 
So far, we have assumed that the worker chooses and receives the 
branch of the rnaximand that is the largest. This is unrealistic for two 
reasons: First, the firm may sever the worker before he reaches the 
optimal date, t*. Second, the worker receives wages and has alternative 
job possibilities as well. 
To  be more  explicit, suppose that at time  t, R(t),  the reservation 
wage, has the distribution function G,[R(t)].  Suppose further that the 
worker does not know R(t)  before period t. Also, let there be an ex- 
ogenous probability  of  separation, either due to unanticipated termi- 
nation by the firm or for health reasons. Let that probability be denoted 
F(t, A), where  t  reflects  the worker’s  tenure and A  his  age.  (This 
becomes important in the empirical section.) If  the worker receives 
reservation value R, in each year t that he does not work for the firm, 
and also W,  during each year that he does, then M(t)  must be redefined 
as 
F(t + 1, A  + 1)M(t +  1)/(1  + Y)  ,  I 167  Pensions and Turnover 
and 
The worker quits when V(t)  is negative. This can be rewritten. Define 
Then equation (1’) implies that the worker quits when 
R, > z(0, 
or he works with probability G,[Z(t)].  Since everything in Z is known 
deterministically, or is unknown and in the future, expected values are 
relevant so that at time t,  Z(t)  is merely a number that can be calculated 
once the distributions of  the R’s are known. Parameterization of the 
G function and observing the number of individuals who quit provide 
that information. 
In the empirical section, it will be assumed that R, = W,  for all t, 
so that only F(t, A)  must be addressed. 
The importance of treating the reservation value, R,, correctly can 
be seen in the context of the standard work-leisure diagram. A number 
of researchers (e.g., Burtless and Hausman 1980; Hausman and Wise 
1985) have used the work-leisure framework to analyze retirement de- 
cisions. Although that approach is instructive, it suffers from its static 
nature. This prevents analysis of  many of the issues that are central 
to this paper. This can be seen in the context of figure 6.1. 
A pension plan (ignoring wages) might result in a nonlinear budget 
constraint with shape ABCDE. This diagram allows us to talk about 
Income 
D 
505355  70  80 
Leisure [t) 
(Years) 
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the total number of years that an individual would choose to work if 
that were a one-time decision. It does not easily permit any uncertainty 
to be incorporated into the analysis. It cannot deal with when work 
occurs over the lifetime. For example, 30 years can be worked as one 
spell of 30 from age 20 to  50 or as  two spells of 10 and 20 years separated 
by  a  10-year hiatus.  The timing  is especially  important for pension 
plans, many of which depend on dates worked either directly or in- 
directly by tying benefits to salary. This is particularly important for 
women. Finally, and most important in this context, is that the decision 
to leave the job is not always a decision to take leisure.  More often, 
it is a choice of a new job over the old one. There is no way (without 
severely straining the interpretation of the utility function) to deal with 
that through a nonlinear budget constraint analysis. 
The option value approach allows us to capture these effects and 
also nests the work-leisure analysis. But it is essential to build in the 
reservation wage, R,, in an appropriate fashion. To see this, consider 
a worker who is deciding how long to work. If leisure has zero value, 
then indifference curves are functions with slope = (1/(1  + r)70-1  at 
each point.  (The analysis is the standard one of when to cut a tree.) 
Under these circumstances, it is impossible that F could dominate D. 
But it is clear that in the work-leisure context, F could be an optimum. 
This is because pure wealth  maximization ignores the value of time 
between years 53 and 50. But if  R5,,  RS2,  Rs3  were sufficiently high, 
and Rs4, RSs,  . . . sufficiently low (as reflected by the highly nonlinear 
indifference curve near F), then F could be an optimum according to 
equation (1’). Our view is that the option approach yields much more 
flexibility to analyze dynamic questions of  timing  of  work and job 
switching,  without  sacrificing  the  implications  of  the  work-leisure 
analysis. 
6.2  Empirical Analysis 
6.2.1  Data 
The data consist of detailed plan descriptions and a personnel roll 
for six plans. The personnel data include the date of hire, birthdate, a 
salary history at the current firm for up to ten years, sometimes marital 
status, and in one case, whether the worker receives an hourly wage 
or salary. Additionally,  accrued benefits and projected benefits  have 
been calculated by the accounting firm that supplied the data, but those 
values were not used in our analysis. 
Because of the proprietary nature of the data, the firms cannot be 
identified. However, some rough descriptions of the industry and work- 
ers are provided here along with a description of the individual plans. 169  Pensions and Turnover 
Plan 1: National women’s clothing retail stores, located in major urban 
areas; 2,083 active employees in pension plan on February  1, 
1984. 
Normal  retirement  annual flow  is  calculated  as .0015  x  (sum  of 
annual earnings - $4,200) for each year employed. This is indexed at 
a CPI factor of no greater than 3 percent for past years. Early retirement 
can be taken at age 60 with 10  years of service. Postponed retirement 
is permitted, and retirement at dates other than the normal date is the 
actuarial equivalent of that received at age 65, conditioned on actual 
years of service and salaries. The plan vests after 10 years. 
Plan 2: Large southwestern mining company. These workers are sal- 
aried, generally managers, who work either in the southwest- 
ern United States or in New York City; 357 active employees 
in the plan as of February  1, 1984. 
The normal retirement annual flow is calculated as average of final 
5  years’ salaries  = AVE. Then the flow per  year is (.0175 AVE  - 
.0125[$9,240]) x  (years of service). There is a maximum flow of 2/3 of 
AVE.  The hire  date must  occur before  the  worker turns  65.  Early 
retirement  is  permitted  at age 55, and  late retirement  to age 70 is 
permitted. There is an early retirement reduction of  .0033 per month 
for each month that retirement occurs before age 60. The formula is 
slightly more complex for individuals who have 30 years of service by 
age 55 or who will reach 30 years before age 60. The plan vests after 
10 years. 
Plan 3: One of the companies under the corporate umbrella of the firm 
described in plan 2. All are salaried employees from the south- 
west; 821 active employees as of February 1, 1984. 
The normal retirement annual flow is calculated as average of final 
5  years’ salaries  = AVE. Then the flow per year is (.0175 AVE  - 
.0125[$9,240]) x  (years of service). Early retirement at age 55 is per- 
mitted,  with the participant  receiving  a reduced pension actuarially 
equivalent to pension beginning at age 65, but for individuals who have 
25  years of service (or more) and are age 60 or older at retirement, 
only 1/2 regular actuarial reduction is to be applied. Late retirement is 
permitted. The plan vests after 10  years. 
Plan 4: These are the hourly rated employees of the company in plan 
3 with job titles ranging from janitorial to electrician to miners. 
999 active employees in plan as of February  1, 1984. 
Normal retirement monthly flow (at age 62) is equal to $17 x  (years 
of service up to 15)  + $18.50 x  (next 15  years of service) + $20  x 
(service years exceeding 30). There are three possible early retirement 
options: (1) at age 60 with the above amount reduced .0033 per month 
for each month prior to age 62; (2) with  30  years of  service and no 
reduction, plus a monthly benefit of  $300 until employee attains age 170  Edward P.  LazeadRobert L. Moore 
62, and a monthly benefit of  $130 payable from 62  until eligible for 
unreduced Social Security benefits; (3) with the same benefit flow as 
in option (2) only the $130 supplement does not apply, under the “70/80” 
rule (the latter only by mutual agreement between employee and com- 
pany. It requires either age 55 with sum of age + service = 70, or age 
less than 55 with sum of  age  + service = 80). Late retirement per- 
mitted. The plan vests after 10 years. 
Plan 5: Salaried employees of the parent company of the major office/ 
home furniture manufacturing firm described in plan 6. Titles 
run from manager to president/owner and include employees 
from locations in California, New Jersey, Tennessee, and var- 
ious other states; 3 10 active employees as of February 1, 1984. 
The normal retirement annual flow (at age 65) is the sum of two parts: 
(1) a prior service benefit  =  1.25 percent of  final 5-year average pay 
at 1/1/84 to $20,000 plus  1.75 percent  of  such average in  excess of 
$20,000, all times the number of years of service as of  1/1/84, and (2) a 
future  service benefit  =  1.25 percent  of  pay  up  to Social Security 
earnings limit, plus 1.75 percent of pay in excess of limit, for each year 
of  service beyond  1/1/84. Early  retirement  at 60 with monthly  flow 
reduced .005 for each month that commencement of payments precedes 
65. The plan vests after 10 years. 
Plan 6: Major office/home furniture manufacturer. Includes both sal- 
aried employees (managers, executives, etc.) and hourly em- 
ployees  (machinists, loading dock  workers, etc.) under the 
same benefit formula. Employees are located in Mid-Atlantic 
states; 1,390 active participants as of February  1, 1984. 
Normal retirement annual flow (at 65) is sum of  two parts:  (1) 1.25 
percent of final 5-year average pay at 1/1/78 up to $12,000, plus  1.75 
percent of  this average that exceeds $12,000 for each year of service 
to  1/1/78, and (2) 1.25 percent of pay  up to Social Security earnings 
limit, plus  1.75 percent of pay exceeding such limit for each year of 
service after 1/1/78. Early retirement at age 55, with monthly pension 
flow reduced .005 for each month that precedes normal reitrement. The 
plan vests after 10 years. 
6.2.2  Simulation of Plan Values 
Given the  plan  descriptions,  it  is  straightforward to compute the 
expected present value of pension  benefits for any hypothetical em- 
ployee who retires at a given age. To  do this, life tables must be used 
and the 1980 Vital Statistics tables for males or females (depending on 
the sex of the hypothetical individual) were selected for this purpose. 
We  calculated the expected present  value for 72  hypothetical em- 
ployees for each plan, and for each of those employees, we computed 
P(t),  the pension value after t years of  service in year t dollars, for t 171  Pensions and Turnover 
ranging from 0 to the t that corresponds to age 85. Note that in all plans 
P(t) = 0 for t less than 10. The 72 employees were obtained by letting 
sex vary, letting wage growth vary from 0 to 3 percent, letting  1984 
salary take on values of  $10,000, $40,000, $70,000, and $100,000, and 
letting the age at which the employee started with the firm take on 
values of 25, 40, and 55. 
Although it was instructive to look at these different kinds of work- 
ers, it turns out that the following patterns were observed. Male and 
female workers differ only  slightly in  pension  values. Wage growth 
steepened the pension accrual path and shifted it upward. Higher sal- 
aries shifted P(t)  upward except in the case of plan 4, which does not 
depend on final salary. The most interesting variation relates to the age 
of the worker at initial employment date. In what follows, we present 
results that emphasize this distinction. 
6.2.3  Options 
Equation (1) defines the appropriate value to examine to understand 
the effects of pensions on turnover (ignoring wages and other com- 
pensation). Once P(t) is defined,  it is straightforward to derive V(t). 
The only additional ingredient is the assumed turnover propensity,  1 
- F,  for which we made the following assumptions: 
F varies with tenure such that F(l) = .7, F(2) = .8, F(3) = .9, F(4) 
= .95, F(t) = .98 fort >  4. However, since the probability of turnover 
is also a function of age, especially after 55, we multiplied what would 
otherwise be the probability of continuation by  [l - 1/(72 - age at 
time t)]  so that the probability of continuation is F at 54, but falls to 0 
at 71, irrespective of tenure. This assumption is admittedly arbitrary, 
but it captures the spirit of declining turnover rates with tenure and 
increasing turnover rates with age above 55. 
Figure 6.2 best summarizes what can be learned from looking at V(t) 
profiles so derived. It displays the  V(t)  and P(r) profiles for one hy- 
pothetical employee-a  male, with wage growth equal to 3 percent, 
with a salary of  $40,000 and starting age of 25 (“a” panels), and 55 
(“b” panels) in each of the six plans. The most striking point is that 
even though the pension does not vest until year 10, so that P(t)  is the 
same and equal to zero for all  years less than  10, the  V(t)  profile is 
upward-sloping in that range. Thus, the value of working year 8 exceeds 
the value of working year 1 not only because it brings the worker closer 
to the vesting year, but also because the optimal pension taking year 
is closer. 
The empirical importance of this is perhaps obvious. Suppose, for 
example, that one had data only on workers who had less than 10 years 
of tenure. If P(t)  were used as the dependent variable, there would be 
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Fig. 6.2  Panel la. Pension Values (P)  and Option Values (V)  for Hy- 
pothetical Worker Hired When “Young”  (Plan 1) 
if  V(t)  were used, it is expected that a negative coefficient would be 
obtained since G(R)  increases in R. As V(t)  rises with r, the probability 
of turnover decreases. (This should be true even holding the normal 
effect of  tenure on retirement constant.) 
A second point that is clear from looking at the V(t)  profiles is that 
the downward spike in V(t)  at the vesting year is much more important 
for the old workers than for the young workers. The reason is that 
young workers are likely to wait to take their pension until some year 
far after 10 years. For example, for plan  1, the likely retirement date 
is 40 years of tenure. For old workers, the likely retirement date is 
much closer since the probability of  exogenous reasons for quitting is 
higher. 
At the empirical level, this implies that there should be a much greater 
proportion of old workers who quit immediately following the vesting 
year than young workers. It would not be surprising to find no effect 
of vesting on young workers since this discontinuity is so small. 173  Pensions and Turnover 
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Panel Ib.  Pension Values (P)  and Option Values (V)  for Hy- 
pothetical Worker Hired When “Old”  (Plan  I).  Figure 6.2 
continues on next puge. 
The third point comes from comparing the P(t)  profiles to the V(t) 
profiles. For workers who begin employment with the firm when young, 
there is sometimes a discontinuity in the V(t)  profile that is not mim- 
icked by the P(t)  profile. For example, in plan  1 (panel Ia), there is a 
very large discrete  jump downward at the 40th year of tenure. The P(t) 
profile is much smoother at that point. This implies that there should 
be significant retirement at t = 40. This would be the prediction if  V(t) 
were the independent variable, but it would appear as noise if P(t)  were 
the independent variable. 
The last point is that the distinction between workers who start when 
old and those who start when young is lost if the P(t)  profile is used. 174  Edward P.  LazeadRobert L. Moore 
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Panel IIa.  Pension Values (P)  and Option Values (V)  for Hy- 
pothetical Worker Hired When “Young”  (Plan 2) 
The shape of the P(t)  profile is basically quite similar in the “a” panels 
of figure 6.2 as it is in the “b” panels. This comes back to the earlier 
point that the incentives to remain on the job are different for old and 
young hires. That is obscured by looking at the P(t)  profile. 
6.2.4  Regressions: Turnover and Pensions 
The formulation in equation (1) says that the value of working another 
year can be calculated from the pension stream, conditional on retire- 
ment at a given date. Given a density of reservation prices at each age/ 
tenure level, the higher the option value the less likely a worker is to 
leave in that given year. This can be modeled more rigorously as follows: 
Recall that if  the reservation price R at tenure t and age A  is dis- 
tributed as G(R;  t, A),  then the probability that the worker chooses to 
continue is 175  Pensions and Turnover 
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Panel  IIb.  Pension  Values  (P)  and  Option  Values  (V)  for 
Hypothetical  Worker  Hired  When  “Old”  (Plan 2). Figure 
6.2 continues on next page. 
GW,; 1,  A). 
Let us parameterize G such that G(V,; t,  A) can be approximated by 
(2)  G(V,; t, A) = exp(ao + a,V, + a2r + a3A). 
Having written equation (2) in this way implies that F(t,  A) is subsumed 
in G and suppressed. If No  workers are hired in each period, then today 
(1984), the tenure of those workers t = 1984 -  start year. The number 
with t years of tenure is then 
(3)  N(0 = No{exp[ao + alVl + az + a3(Ao,  {exp[ao + alV2 
+ 42)  + a3(Ao+2)ll  . . .  {exp[ao + alVt + 4)  + a3(Ao+,)1}, 176  Edward P.  LazeadRobert L. Moore 
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Panel  IIIa. Pension  Values  (P)  and Option Values (V)  for 
Hypothetical Worker Hired When “Young”  (Plan 3) 
where A. is the age at which the workers are hired. (This ignores the 
fact that workers are hired at different ages. This is dealt with below.) 
Taking logs, equation (3) can be written as 
I  t  I 
In  N(r) = In  No + aor  + al  V, + a2  i + a3  &+A, 
i= 1  i= 1  i= 1 
or 
or 
(4)  lnN(r) = Bo + B,r + B2X + B3Y + B4Z, 177  Pensions and Turnover 
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Panel  IIIb. Pension  Values (P)  and  Option  Values  (V) for 
Hypothetical  Worker  Hired  When  “Old”  (Plan  3). Figure 
6.2 continues on next page. 
where 
X  = 2 Vi,  Y =  i, Z =  (Ao+J. 
i= 1  i= 1  i-  1 
Equation (4) is the basic estimating equation. It allows for estimation 
of  age-tenure specific hazard rates. 
Implicit in the derivation of  equation (4) is the assumption that all 
workers are alike in V,  once t and A, is known. This would be true if 
there were no variation in salary history and if all workers began em- 
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cannot be valid. It is conceptually possible to calculate the V vector 
for every worker in  the sample; we take an intermediate approach. 
Workers are separated by  plan and by  starting age. Thus, there are 
eighteen groups: for each plan, workers were classified as having started 
work between ages 20  and 35, 36 and 50, and 51 and older. The results 
below throw out information on the intermediate groups and focus on 
workers who started when  they  were young  or old.  The N(t) that 
appears on the left-hand side of equation (4) is the number of individuals 
in a given plan, within a given starting age category, that have tenure 
of t years. For the calculation of Z, it was assumed that A. was 25 if 
the workers began when young, and that A. was 55 if the workers began 
when old. Workers were assumed to earn $40,000 in 1984 and the wage 
growth rate was set at 3  percent. The discount rate for all purposes 
was 5 percent. The coefficient on X  is then the effect of pensions on 
the probability of leaving. Note that, for now, nothing having to  do  with 
workers’ wages is being held  constant. Implicitly,  it is assumed that 
W,  = R,  for all t. 
There are 366 observations, 61 for each plan. The 61  observations 
come from 45 tenure categories for workers who started employment 








Panel  1Vb. Pension  Values (P)  and Option Values  (V)  for 
Hypothetical Worker Hired  When “Old”  (Plan 4). Figure 
6.2 continues on next page. 
The basic equation is reported in column 1 of table 6.1 (pp. 184-85). 
The variable of  interest, X,  has a negative coefficient. This is the op- 
posite of what is expected. Higher  V(t)  should be associated  with  a 
lower propensity to leave. Comparison with other columns provides 
the reason for this anomalous result. 
First, compare column  1  with column  2.  “Old”  is a dummy  that 
equals 1 when the observation is associated with the group that started 
in the 50 and above category. Note that (Old)(X) has a positive coef- 
ficient that is more than an order of  magnitude than the one on X. 
Evidently, V is not important for workers who start when young, but 
is important for those who start when old. For these old hires, V has 
an effect on turnover propensities. This is not a proper rationalization, 
however, because there should be no difference between old and young 180  Edward P.  LazeadRobert L. Moore 
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workers that is not already captured by the calculation of V.  There are 
some possible explanations. 
The most obvious is the selection of the wrong discount rate. Suppose 
that 5 percent is too low a discount rate. Then there is a variation in 
the V series for young workers that really should not be there relative 
to the variation for old. If a higher discount rate were used, V would 
not vary for the young and a larger coefficient on V would be the likely 
result. In fact, there exists some discount rate that would make the 
coefficient on (Old)(X) zero. All differences between old and young in 
turnover behavior would be captured by  V. It is conceivable, but at 
least to our minds totally intractable, to simultaneously estimate the 
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6.2 continues on next page. 
a  different  number of  individuals get  hired  in  when old than when 
young. That is, No  for old hires is not the same as  No  for young hires.) 
A second, and perhaps more important, factor in the explanation of 
the negative coefficient on V is that the equation estimated in column 1 
ignores wages altogether. To  take account of this, we must allow for 
wages and wage growth to shift the relationship  in two ways. First, 
firms that pay higher average wages or offer more wage growth may 
have a different number of new hires, No. This may be because of a 
trade-off of fewer numbers of higher quality workers, or other factors. 
Second, given that the worker has joined the firm, wage levels and 
wage growth have an effect on retaining the worker. These shift G and 
are parameterized by adding W (wage level) and WG (wage growth) to 
equation (2). This implies that (t)(W)  and (t)(WG)  belong in the esti- 
mating equation. These terms really relate to  the average net difference 
between W, and R,.  This is not quite correct, however. A more complete 
approach would build the parameterization of R into G directly. Then 182  Edward P.  LazeadRobert L. Moore 
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the discount rate and all coefficients could be estimated simultaneously. 
Given the tentative nature of our data, we have chosen not to  undertake 
this difficult estimation. 
Because of data problems, the wages for workers in plan 4 (a pattern 
plan  that is independent of  salary) are not reported correctly.  As a 
result, all those 61 observations are dropped. The equation estimated 
in  column  2  was reestimated without  these 61  observations. These 
results are contained in column 4 and do not differ substantially from 
those of column 2. Column 5 reports the results when the wage vari- 
ables are incorporated. (Wage growth for each plan was estimated in 
the usual manner.) As can be seen from the coefficient on (t)(W),  higher 
wage firms are less likely to lose their workers. The sign on V for young 
workers becomes positive, but is still statistically different from that 
for older workers. 183  Pensions and Turnover 
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To assess the importance of the effect of  V on turnover, differentiate 
(1 - G)  with the respect to V. Estimates from column 5 are used. The 
elasticity is 2.16 so that a 10 percent increase in  V reduces the prob- 
ability of turnover (for old workers) by  22 percent (evaluated at the 
means). The estimated probability  of  retention is .96 (at the means). 
What is perhaps more instructive is to compare what the probability 
of  retention would be if V were zero. Under these circumstances, the 
retention rate would be about .91. This amounts to a doubling of the 
turnover rate  (from 4  percent  per  year  to 9 percent  per  year) and 
suggests the possibility of an important effect. 
The estimated retention rate seems quite high. There are at least two 
possible explanations. First, these firms all have pension plans and may 
have atypical turnover rates as a result. Second, the process may not 
be stationary. For example, suppose that employment in these firms 
were declining over time. Then more workers would have been hired Table 6.1  Estimation of  Equation (4) (Dependent Variable = N  in 1984) 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  = In  No 
W  = average wage 
r (coefficient = ao) 
WG (average amount 
of wage growth) 
x-svj 
(coefficient = al) 
Y-Zi 
(coefficient = a2) 
(coefficient = a,) 
Old (dummy =  1 if 
observation from 55 
year old group 





-1.75  x  10-7 









-1.57  x  10-7 
(7.78  x  10-7) 
-  ,0024 
(.0007) 






N  = 305 
2.94  4.27  1.96 
(.20)  (.52) 
-7.9  x  10-5 
(1.2 x  10-5) 
,039  ,019  .204 
(.041)  (.042)  (.018) 
13.2 
(6.9) 
-2.47  x  lo-’  1.57 x  10-7 
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20  years ago than  10  years  ago. This makes it appear that turnover 
rates are low because there is a large number of workers in the t = 20 
category relative to those in the t  = 10 category. 
There are some other interesting results that come from table 6.1. 
As  expected, the coefficient on Z  (age) is negative  and statistically 
significant, but not important in  terms of magnitude. There must be 
some nonlinearity in this relationship that we have not explored. It is 
likely that, at young ages, increases in  age actually reduce the prob- 
ability of turnover, but at old ages the reverse is true. The effect of 
tenure on turnover rates cannot be discerned in these data independent 
of the pension  effect.  Column  1  reveals that  the coefficient on  Y is 
small and unimportant. 
It is interesting to compare the “naive”  approach, which uses P as 
the relevant variable, with the more sophisticated approach that uses 
V. Columns 3 and 6 do that. In column 3, P and (Old)(P) are entered 
as independent variables and X and (Old)(X) are deleted. They behave 
in a way similar to that of X and (Old)(X). This is not suprising because 
the correlation of P with X  is .70. However, the interpretation of P is 
problematic. Do we  expect  a negative or positive coefficient on P? 
When P is high, should workers work that year or take the pension? 
A better alternative specification enters P(t) -  P(t - I), represented 
by  AP in table 6.1, as the independent variable. This should have a 
clear positive effect on the number of  workers in a given year. More 
workers should be willing to stay when the change in the pension value 
associated with working another year is high. (Note that there is no 
income effect unless  the year is worked, so a positive effect is nec- 
essary.) Of course, this obscures the fact that there is a greater pension 
value to working year 9 than in year  1, which is captured by V.  Again, 
V and the change in P,  AP, are correlated at .4, so even if P(t) - P(t 
- 1)  were totally inappropriate, it would pick up the effect of  V. In 
column 6, the change in P does have an effect in the right direction. 
(When both AP and X  are entered, interacted with Old, (Old)(X) mat- 
ters whereas (Old)[P(t) - P(t - l)] does not. Both AP and X  enter 
significantly, but are small. These results are not shown in table 6.1 .) 
One final problem that should be mentioned is that males and females 
are mixed in  this analysis to obtain a large enough number of obser- 
vations. Since they have different earnings and experience patterns, 
future research will separate males from females. 
6.3  Conclusions and Summary 
We  have attempted to investigate the effects of pensions on worker 
turnover using a newly constructed data set, which contains microdata 
on actual employees under six different actual pension plans. An im- 187  Pensions and Turnover 
portant distinction is made between P(t),  the pension value after r years 
of  service, and the option  value, V(t),  which we  argue is the more 
appropriate value to examine to understand the effects of pensions on 
turnover. 
The paper then calculates and contrasts the profiles of these values 
for hypothetical  employees under  the  six different  plans  and some 
implications are drawn from these profiles. The analysis demonstrates 
that the effects of  vesting are more important for workers who were 
old at the hiring date than for workers who were young at the hiring 
date. Although the P(t)  profile is flat prior to vesting, the V(t)  profile 
is more continuous. The V(t)  profile predicts different turnover behavior 
than the P(t)  profile. 
The preliminary results of  the actual effect of these (more appro- 
priate) option values on turnover are presented. Assuming a stationary 
process, these results show that a 10  percent increase in  the option 
value reduces the probability of turnover for old workers by 22 percent. 
Turnover rates are predicted to be twice as high for workers without 
pensions as for those with the average pension (a change from 4 percent 
to 9 percent per year). Finally, we investigate empirically the different 
implications for turnover of the two measures of pension values. 
The results presented here should be regarded as tentative, at best. 
The data that we currently have do not  provide any information  on 
individuals who left the firm. Thus, all inferences about turnover must 
be  drawn from an examination of  the tenure  distribution of  current 
employees. In future research, after the required data have been ob- 
tained, that defect will be remedied. We  have also taken a number of 
shortcuts. A full nonlinear model, which yields the discount factor and 
hazard  function  simultaneously,  was  described,  but  not  estimated. 
Nevertheless, the fact that such strong effects of pensions on turnover 
are obtained suggests that this is an area well worth pursuing. 
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Comment  Michael D. Hurd 
Defined benefit pension plans typically induce great year-to-year vari- 
ation in the implicit compensation for a year’s work. For example, the 
value of a pension conditional on separation can jump from zero to a 
substantial value in the year of vesting. Many previous investigators 
have viewed this as a spike in compensation and have studied its effect 
on turnover. The authors perform a useful service by pointing out that 
the value to a worker of a defined benefit pension plan is not simply 
the change in  the present value conditional on separation. The value 
will depend on the shape of the pension plan over all possible retirement 
years. For example, even though a worker may not be vested, the plan 
becomes more valuable each year until vesting because the worker is 
a year closer to the vesting date. The authors attempt to quantify the 
change in value by what they call the option value of the pension plan. 
The option value is supposed to represent, as far as pension accrual is 
concerned, the reward from a year of work. To  calculate the option 
value of work in year t,  one first finds the retirement date which max- 
imizes the expected present value in year t dollars under the assumption 
that the worker works during year t. The option value of the plan is 
this expected present value less the expected present value of the plan 
given retirement at t - 1. The option value has the desirable feature 
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of imputing a positive value to the plan even before vesting. The authors 
proceed to use the option value to explain the probability of turnover. 
The term “option value” is somewhat unfortunate here. It suggests 
that the worker would be willing to pay at a maximum the option value 
to work another year. A simplified example shows that is not the case. 
Suppose the worker is not vested, and that the inflation and interest 
rates are zero. Then the option value is just the sum of the pension 
payments should the worker retire at the date when that sum is max- 
imum. But that sum is not what the worker would be willing to pay to 
work another year, because the worker must work all the future years 
until the retirement date. Furthermore, if  leisure has value, workers 
may  not  choose retirement at  the date of  maximum  pension  value; 
then, variations in maximum pension value will be irrelevant for study 
of turnover. The problem, as revealed in the authors’ figure 6.1, is that 
the budget constraint is nonlinear, probably with nonconvex regions. 
Choice of retirement date then depends on the global properties of both 
the budget  constraint  and  the  indifference  curves.  It is  simply  not 
possible to summarize the situation with a single number such as the 
option value. The only internally consistent estimation method we have 
was developed in the labor supply literature; examples are cited by 
Lazear and Moore. The authors argue, however, that those methods, 
based on a global comparison of utility in a diagram like figure 6.1, are 
not adequate. Their first objection is that the model cannot allow for 
uncertainty. I do not see the force of this objection, as one could always 
specify that  the budget  constraint  is offered  with  some probability. 
Their second objection  is  that the model is  static, not  allowing for 
interruptions in work. I believe this objection is rather weak. For ex- 
ample, to analyze retirement one could redefine the arguments of the 
lifetime utility function to be rest-of-lifetime income and leisure after 
the last reentry into the labor force. Their last objection is that the 
worker’s decision is not simply whether to work or not, but involves 
choosing over several jobs. But several job choices can be included 
by constructing budget sets for each job and allowing the global utility- 
maximizing choice to be made. In that the option value approach eval- 
uates the budget constraint at just one point, whereas the budget con- 
straint should be evaluated to find the global maximum, I believe the 
approach of the authors is not the best to understand job quitting. 
Even if the option value were the appropriate variable to explain the 
probability of quitting, the data available to the authors make it almost 
impossible to estimate the relationship. To understand how quits are 
affected, one needs observations on the leavers and the stayers, except 
under special circumstances.  In these data, only the stayers are ob- 
served. If everything were static, estimation might be possible: essen- 190  Edward P.  LazeadRobert L. Moore 
tially the original size and composition  of the oldest cohorts are de- 
duced from the size and composition of the younger cohorts. But there 
are 45 tenure categories, which means that the rates of hiring by age 
would have had to have been constant for 45 years, from 1939 to 1984; 
this seems unlikely in a growing economy. Without such stability, the 
number of people in each tenure category can reflect  the growth or 
decline of the company rather than the reaction of the cohorts to the 
pension plans.  Furthermore, even if  the rate of  hiring by age were 
steady over such a long period, the estimation  method requires that 
the structure of the pension program remain the same over those years: 
such stability is necessary if one is to use the pension structure in 1984 
to understand turnover rates over past years. Without information on 
the stability of the pension structure over past years, I am not sure we 
can have much confidence in an approach that requires it. 
In  my  view,  the data could  be  used  in other ways. It  should be 
possible to construct some simple tables which reveal facts about how 
tenure varies with provisions of the pension plans. For example, if a 
plan heavily penalizes work after 30 years of service, a table showing 
the extent of work past 30 years would give us an idea of the importance 
of  that provision. Such tables would provide guidance in modeling and 
hypothesis testing which could be carried out on data more suited for 
turnover studies. 
In summary, I think the authors have pointed the way toward a better 
modeling of the influence of pensions on turnover; yet, the data they 
have are not detailed enough to quantify the effect. Rather than pro- 
ducing some estimates that are difficult  to interpret, I  would  prefer 
cross-tabulations and tables that describe the data and, in particular, 
how the age and tenure distributions vary by pension plan. 